The structure of communication networks is an important determinant of the capacity of teams, organizations, and societies to solve policy, business, and science problems. Yet, previous studies reached contradictory results about the relationship between network structure and performance, finding support for the superiority of both efficient and inefficient network structures. Here we argue that understanding how communication networks affect collective performance requires taking into consideration the social learning strategies of individual team members. We show that different social learning strategies lead to remarkably different outcomes in different communication networks. Specifically, efficient networks outperform the inefficient networks when individuals rely on the conformity strategy. However, inefficient networks are superior when team members rely on the best member strategy. In addition, we find that collectives relying on conformity based on a small sample of other individuals excel on complex tasks, while collectives following the best member achieve best performance for simple tasks. Our findings reconcile contradictory results in the literature, and have broad implications for the study of social learning across disciplines.
Introduction
The trade-off between exploration and exploitation lies at the heart of many problems faced by individuals, groups and organizations, who often need to decide whether to search for new, potentially better solutions (e.g., a technology, social institution, or a business strategy) or keep using an existing solution that works well [11, 12, 14, 20, 23, 26] . The right balance between exploration (searching for superior novel solutions) and exploitation (reaping benefits of existing solutions) is thought to be essential for adaptive behavior in humans and other animals [19, 20, 23] . When individuals interact through social learning to solve problems collectively, this trade-off is manifested in the balance between innovation through individual learning from the environment and the imitation of existing solutions in the population [8, 15, 16, 27, 29] . Innovation (exploration) is essential both for tracking changes in the environment, and for introducing novelty in the population, while imitation (exploitation) serves the purpose of diffusing good solutions in order to increase individual and group-level performance [5] .
How do different social learning strategies affect the balance of exploration and exploitation behaviors in collective problem solving and the resulting performance? And how do these strategies interact with the social or organizational network in which learning takes place? We address these two questions by modeling different social learning strategies as algorithms composed of three cognitively plausible building blocks, previously studied in the literature on individual decision making in non-social contexts: rules that guide information search, stopping search, and making a decision [9] . We study how groups of individuals using different strategies perform in task environments characterized by different levels of complexity, while embedded in social networks varying in structural properties that have been shown to affect the ease of information flow in communities [4, 7, 8, 10, 18, 18, 21, 21, 30] .
We make two contributions. First, we demonstrate how the building blocks of social learning strategies can lead to strikingly different exploration-exploitation patterns and, as a result, to different levels of performance in simple and complex task environments. Second, we clarify and reconcile seemingly contradictory results in the literature by showing how social learning strategies and network structure interact to affect collective performance. Specifically, a number of studies have found that network structures that promote slower information diffusion (i.e, are less efficient) enhance collective performance because they lead to higher levels of exploration and increase the chance of finding better solutions in the population [7, 8, 18, 22] . In contrast, a recent study, focusing on the same question, came to the opposite conclusion, finding that networks promoting faster information flow (i.e., those that are more efficient) lead to better performance [21] . Here we show that one can obtain both results for the same type of collective problem-solving task. We argue that answering the question of how network structure affects performance requires studying how it interacts with the social learning strategies used by individuals.
Collective problem solving
We conceptualize collective problem solving as a task involving a group of individuals repeatedly searching for solutions that improve individual and group-level performance. We follow several authors in modeling this problem as search on rugged landscapes [7, 18, 21, 24, 34] . The main difficulty encountered by problem solvers searching such landscapes is the presence of several local optima (i.e., peaks) from which it is difficult to find better solutions. As a result, collectives face the challenge of finding good solutions without getting stuck in local optima.
Task environment
To design the task environment we use the N K model [17] , which is a "tunably rugged" landscape determined by N , the number of components that make up each solution, and K, the number of interdependencies between these components. N and K together determine the structure of the task environment where different solutions in the space have different payoffs (we also study an alternative 2-dimensional landscape and present results in the Supporting Information).
We focus on two different environments, a simple one with a single optimum (N = 15, K = 0) and a complex one with several locally optimal solutions (N = 15, K = 7) (see Methods for implementation details and Fig S6 for an illustration of the landscapes). We report results for several other values of K in the Supporting Information. Individuals were each assigned random starting solutions, and searched the space of possible N -digit solutions by modifying single digits in their current solutions.
Network structure
We study a number of different communication networks varying in the structural properties that have been shown to affect collective performance. At the two extremes we consider a fully connected network where each individual is connected to everyone else in the population and a locally connected lattice where individuals are connected to their d immediate neighbors. In addition we consider eight network structures that were proposed in a recent study focusing on the relationship between network structure and collective performance [21] . Taken together, these networks cover a broad spectrum of possible structures and include all of the networks that were studied in Lazer and Friedman (2007) , Mason and Watts (2012) , and Derex and Boyd (2016) [7, 18, 22] , the recent studies that reached incompatible results about the role of network structure on collective performance. All networks were assumed to have n = 100 nodes and a fixed degree of d = 19, except for the fully connected network where d = n − 1. This produces the same degree-to-node ratio as in the study of Mason and Watts (2012) . More details about all networks are provided in Methods and the Supporting Information.
Learning strategies
We focus on three frequently studied social learning strategies, namely: (1) best member rule [28] , (2) conformity [13] , and (3) random copying [29] .
We formalize the social learning strategies as algorithms composed of three basic cognitive building blocks: rules that guide information search, stopping search, and making a decision [9] ; (i) Search rule: all individuals search randomly among their connections.
(ii) Stopping rule: individuals stop searching after looking up the solutions of s other individuals. We focus on two sample sizes: individuals stop after collecting either a relatively small (s = 3) or a relatively large (s = 9) sample of other individuals with whom they are connected (see Supporting Information for an analysis of other sample sizes).
(iii) Decision rule: individuals either consider the solution of the best performing agent in the sample; consider the most frequent solution (in case each solution is equally frequent, they rely on individual learning); or consider the solution of a random agent in the sample.
Upon implementing social learning, individuals observe whether the socially learned solution produces a higher payoff than their current solution. If yes, they switch to the socially learned solution; otherwise they engage in individual learning. Individual learning consists of exploration by modifying a single digit in the current solution and observing whether it produces a higher payoff. If yes, individuals switch to the alternative solution; otherwise they keep the current solution.
For the simulation we assume n = 100 individuals and assign them random starting solutions, resulting in a high level of initial diversity. On each time step individuals first engage in social learning (as described above) and, conditionally, switch to individual learning. We iterate the procedure for t = 200 time steps, and record the average payoff in the population on each time step separately for each combination of strategy, network structure, and task environment. Results reported are averaged across 1000 different draws of N K environments with the same parameters N and K. Table S3 in the Supporting Information; and Figure S7 for a plot of performance variability across repetitions). Here we focus on the performance of different social learning strategies in a fully connected network, and discuss different network configurations in the next section. 
Results

Performance of different social learning strategies
Performance in simple environments.
In the simple environments (where K = 0) all strategies eventually find the global optimum, however, strategies differ in the time they need to converge to this optimum (Panel A of Figure 1 ). The best member strategies lead to the fastest convergence, followed by the conformity strategies and random copying. Because simple environments are dominated by only one optimum, the tension between exploration and exploitation is not very pronounced, since eventually every individual will end up finding the best solution. This can also been seen from Figure 2 , Panel A which shows the number of unique solutions in a population over time. The number of unique solutions converges to 1 for all strategies, indicating that the entire population converges on the global optimum.
Performance in complex environments.
Panel B of Figure 1 shows two striking results. First, the small-sample versions of both strategies outperform their large-sample versions. This occurs because small samples provide noisy information about the frequency of different solutions in the population. This noisy information reduces the chance that individuals can find good solutions early on and, as a result, makes individuals engage in higher levels of exploration. This in turn increases the chance that over time they will find better solutions. Second, the conformity strategy relying on small samples (s = 3) converges to the highest long-run outcomes, outperforming the best member strategies by a large margin. Best member strategies reach the highest short-run outcomes, but they quickly drive the whole population toward locally optimal solutions, from which individual exploration is no longer able to find better solutions (see also [7, 8, 18] ). As a result the whole population gets stuck in an inferior state. This can also be seen from Figure 2 , Panel B which shows that the best member strategies converge to a single unique solution. In contrast, the conformity strategies converge more slowly and to multiple solutions, leading to higher level of exploration while still allowing the infrequent but superior option to diffuse through the population. The superiority of the small-sample conformity (s = 3) strategy stems both from the heightened levels of exploration and from its capacity for diffusing rare but superior solutions through the population (see also [2, 25] ). That hightened exploration alone is not enough can be seen from the fact that small-sample conformity outperforms two simple benchmarks that involve more exploration but cannot diffuse good solutions, namely random copying and pure individual learning. This pattern of results was replicated in all complex landscapes (N > K > 0, see Table S3 ).
Random copying, like best member, engages in high levels of exploitation in the beginning and drives individuals to several locally optimal solutions (as can be seen from Figure 2 ). However, since this decision rule is not biased towards any criteria related to success (such as the best option or the most frequent option) it is not able to drive the population to good solutions. Similarly, pure individual learning engages only in exploration but cannot spread the good solutions through the population. It was outperformed by all social learning strategies, replicating the finding that collectives outperform individuals in this task [18, 21, 30] .
Taken together, these results indicate that different social learning strategies lead to different patterns of explorative and exploitative behavior over time. The extent to which different strategies prove useful depend crucially on their building blocks (search, stopping and decision rules). Strategies using the best member rule lead to high levels of exploitation and drive the population toward local optima. Strategies using the conformity rule promote higher levels of exploration and can enable the population to find higher-payoff solutions when relying on small samples. We replicate the same finding in changing environments and report results in the Supporting Information (section C, Sensitivity checks).
Interaction of network structure and social learning strategy
We have seen that different strategies can achieve remarkably different performance within the same network structure. At the same time, different network structures are also known to affect performance by changing the relative use of exploration and exploitation [7, 8, 18, 21, 22] . How does network structure interact with social learning strategies?
Previous studies reached contradictory results. For example, Lazer and Friedman (2007) used an agent-based simulation to compare a fully connected network to a locally connected lattice and found that the locally connected lattice outperformed the fully connected network in the long run (see also [7, 8] ). This result implies that inefficient networks (that lead to slower information spread) achieve better outcomes. Mason and Watts (2012) report a behavioral experiment with eight different networks (see Table S1 ). In contrast to Lazer and Friedman, they find that efficient networks (that are faster at spreading information in the population) outperform inefficient networks.
What is driving this difference in results? Here we show that both results can be obtained depending on the social learning strategies that individuals use in a given network. We study ten different networks reported in Table S1 . We focus on the two best performing social learning strategies in complex task environments, the best member and conformity strategies with small samples (s = 3).
The top row of Figure 3 shows the average payoff achieved by groups in different networks. The left panel shows the average performance of the efficient and inefficient networks when individuals use the best member strategy, while the right panel shows the same performance when individuals rely on the conformity strategy. The shaded regions show the performance variability across different networks. Results in the left panel replicate the findings of Lazer and Friedman (2007) who find that inefficient networks outperform efficient networks. This is expected given that their individuals relied on the best member strategy. Results in the right panel replicate the findings of Mason and Watts (2012) who report the opposite result. Our results indicate that this finding would be expected if participants used a strategy similar to conformity. By comparing the two panels we can also see that the conformity strategy outperforms the best member strategy in each network. The same conclusions can be drawn from the bottom row of Figure 3 , which shows average performance at the final time step (t = 200) for each network.
We also examine the relationship between the diameter of a network and the average payoff achieved by individuals. Higher diameters indicate less efficiency at spreading information. Figure 4 shows that the relationship between diameter and average performance is positive for the case when individuals rely on the best member (s = 3) strategy and negative when individuals rely on the conformity (s = 3) strategy, confirming that network efficiency has opposite effects depending on the strategy being used (the relationship between clustering coefficient and average performance shows the same pattern of results).
Our findings demonstrate that both efficient and inefficient networks can lead to superior performance, depending on the social learning strategies used by individuals in the group. They suggest that network structure and social learning strategies jointly affect the levels of exploration and exploitation in the population. If both strategy and network promote high levels of the same activity (either exploration or exploitation), performance is likely to drop, however, if network and strategy promote opposite behaviors, performance is likely to rise.
Discussion
We asked two questions. First, how do different social learning strategies affect behavior and performance in collective problem solving in simple and complex task environments? We found that best member strategies reach the best performance in simple task environments, but weak conformity, achieved by relying on small samples, ensures the highest long-run outcomes when task environments are complex. The intuition underlying these results is the following. The best member strategies are fast at diffusing useful information and, therefore, quickly drive the population toward locally optimal solutions. The conformity strategy leads to slower convergence and thereby allows the population to explore and find solutions that have higher payoffs. Small samples have similar effect and help both strategies in complex environments.
Second, how do these strategies interact with the network structure? Our results indicate that efficient networks promoting faster information diffusion outperform the inefficient networks when individuals use the conformity strategy. However, the opposite is the case when individuals use the best member strategy: here, inefficient networks outperform efficient ones. This shows that collective performance depends both on the network structure individuals are embedded in as well as the social learning strategies they use. We used this insight to clarify and reconcile seemingly contradictory findings from the literature, by showing that both well connected and less well connected networks can be beneficial for the same task, depending on the social learning strategies used by individuals [7, 8, 18, 21, 22] . Recently, Shore et al. (2015) showed that different network structures can be better for different types of tasks involved in problem solving [30] . Here we show that social learning strategies can change the performance of different networks for the exact same task.
Our results replicate the findings of both Lazer and Friedman (2007) who studied the best member strategy in agent-based simulations and found superiority of less efficient networks, as well as the findings of Mason and Watts (2012) who conducted behavioral experiments and found that more efficient networks are more superior. While we do not know the exact strategies that participants employed in the latter experiments, Figure 4 in Mason and Watts (2012) and the surrounding discussion suggests that their participants where more likely to copy a solution if two or more group members exhibited it, indicating that they relied on some form of frequency dependent social learning, similar to our conformity strategy. Mason and Watts (2012) also found that individuals in efficient networks explored more than those in inefficient networks, suggesting that network efficiency on its own should not lead to premature convergence on local optima. Our results agree with this finding and suggest that one reason for it is the social learning strategy used by their participants. Overall, our findings provide a novel perspective on the relationship between network structure and collective performance and raise a number of issues that could be tested in future empirical studies. While previous experiments have focused on fixed groups where individuals have access to the choices of all of their connections, the question of how individuals decide whom to copy and how many individuals they sample remains unaddressed. Studies of this question could also provide insights into how people decide to form network connections and how networks evolve during the learning process. In addition we believe that it is crucial to understand how individuals adapt their social learning strategies in response to perceived social network structure. Finally, future studies could employ real-world networks from large-scale organizations or online platforms.
Our study has broad implications for organizational learning, technological innovation, cultural evolution, and the diffusion of innovations. Research on technological innovation has highlighted the combinatorial nature of innovation with most new inventions being recombinations of existing technologies [1, 32] . Much of this research has focused on how innovation occurs, whereas there has been very little attention devoted to the co-evolution of innovation and the simultaneous imitation of these innovations. We identify situations where imitation can both help and hinder the development of technological innovation. In addition, most studies of exploration and exploitation in organizations focus on how to design the external environment to make groups more adaptive [6, 8, 18, 31] . Our results highlight that it is also important to consider the social learning strategies used by individuals and organizations, and shows that interventions aimed at changing the social environment while disregarding these strategies might not produce the desired effects.
Methods
Generating the task environment
To construct the task environment we represent each solution in the environment by an N -length vector composed of binary digits, leading to a total of 2 N possible solutions in the task environment. The payoff of each solution is calculated as the average of the payoff contributions of each element. The payoff contribution of each element is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. In the case of K = 0, a simple average of the N elements is taken: 
.., N K ). Which of the K − 1 other components a given element is interdependent with is determined randomly. In other words, when K = 0, changing any single element of the solution will affect only the contribution of that element, whereas when K > 0, changing a single element will change the payoff contribution of the K − 1 other elements. When K = 0, exploration of solutions through the modification of single components can prove effective, but as K increases, local exploration becomes less and less effective [19] .
Following several authors [18, 31] , we normalize the payoffs of different solutions by dividing them by the maximum obtainable payoff on a landscape P N orm = P i /max(P ). The distribution of normalized payoffs tends to follow a normal distribution with decreasing variance as K increases. This implies that most solutions tend to cluster around very similar payoff values. Following [18] we use a monotonic transformation, raising P N orm to the power of 8 ( (P N orm ) 8 ) to widen the distribution, making most solutions "mediocre" and only a few solutions "very good".
Generating the networks
For all networks we assume n = 100 nodes or individuals.
Fully connected network: For each node we assign all other nodes as neighbors, leading to n − 1 neighbors for each node.
Locally connected lattice: For each node we assign the d = 19 closest nodes as neighbors, keeping the degree fixed across nodes.
Mason & Watts networks:
We follow the procedure described in Mason & Watts (2012) to construct additional 8 networks. Starting from a random graph with n = 100 nodes and a fixed degree of d = 19 we perform degree-preserving rewirings. After each rewiring we record the network measure of interest ((a) closeness centrality, (b) betweenness centrality, (c) clustering coefficient, and (d) network constraint) and accept the rewiring only if it maximizes or minimizes the network measure of interest. We continue the rewiring process until we are no longer able to obtain a network with a lower (higher) network measure. We repeat this process 100 times to avoid getting stuck in local maxima or minima. The topology of the network in Table S1 indicates the network measure of interest and whether it was maximized or minimized. For example, for the network "Min avg clustering" we looked at the average clustering in the network, and kept rewiring it until we could no longer find networks with a lower (minimum) average clustering score.
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A Properties of networks studied Table S1 shows the properties of all the networks we studied. In addition to a fully connected network where each individual is connected to everyone else in the population and a locally connected lattice where individuals are connected to their d immediate neighbors, we included eight network structures that were proposed in a recent study focusing on the relationship between network structure and collective performance [21] . Each of these eight networks were constructed to maximize or minimize a specific network measure, namely: (a) closeness centrality, or the average length of shortest paths between a node and all other nodes, (b) betweenness centrality, or the average proportion of shortest paths between pairs of nodes that pass through a node, (c) clustering coefficient, or the average connectedness of a node's neighbors, and (d) network constraint, or the average extent to which a node bridges different groups of individuals (see column "Topology" in Table S1 ). In addition we measured the diameter of the network, that is, the shortest distance between the two most distant nodes in the network. The exact method for constructing the networks is reported in the Methods section.
The top five networks in Table S1 are efficient at spreading information, while the bottom five networks are inefficient, as indicated by their diameter and clustering coefficients (for both measures, higher values typically indicate less efficiency, with the exception of the fully connected network in which the whole network is composed of a single cluster). Note that the classification of two networks (Min max closeness (efficient) and Max var constraint (inefficient)) differ from the classification in Mason and Watts (2012) . This is because in our larger node networks lead to different network measures for these networks, leading to a different classification.
B Mason and Watts landscape
In our analyses we focused on the N K fitness landscape, which is an N dimensional environment. However, the study of Mason and Watts (2012) focused on a 2-dimensional landscape. To see whether our main argument also applies to the landscape they studied, we re-run our main analyses on this 2-dimensional landscape. We use the information provided in Mason and Watts (2012) to construct the landscape.
All details remain the same as in our main study, except for how individual learning is performed. We follow Mason and Watts (2012) in modeling individual learning as myopic search and varying the level of myopia. The level of myopia here refers to the extent to which individuals are able to evaluate solutions that are further away from their current solutions. We consider four values: 3, 6, 12 and 20. As Mason and Watts (2012) note: "...r = 6 is equivalent to the radius of the main peak and r = 20 is roughly half of the grid length (L = 50); hence, the r = 3 setting is extremely myopic, whereas r = 20 is only weakly restrictive." Figures S1-S4 show the results. In all four cases we are able to replicate our main finding that efficient networks outperform inefficient networks when individuals rely on conformity (s = 3), while inefficient networks are better than efficient networks when individuals rely on best member (s = 3) strategy. Overall, these results indicate that the contradictory results in the literature might result from the social learning strategies used by individuals. However, we find that the superiority of inefficient networks in this 2D landscape is considerably smaller than in the NK landscape. One particular reason for this is that the payoffs in the NK environment are heavily skewed to make most solutions "mediocre" and only a few solutions "really good" [18] . We find that a similar rescaling of the Mason and Watts (2012) environment leads to larger differences between networks. Further research should explore how the scaling of the payoff and the structural differences between several multi-peaked landscapes affect collective performance [3] .
C Sensitivity checks
Apart from the details mentioned in each section below, all other aspects of the simulation remain identical to the ones reported in the main study.
Changing task environments. We model two cases of environmental change. In the first case we completely regenerate the N K landscape (N =15, K=7) half-way through the simulation, forcing individuals to re-learn everything that was adaptive in the past. This represents an environment that changes rarely but drastically (for an example see [33] ). In the second case we redraw the fitness contribution of a randomly selected single digit in the solution space every 40th time step. This represents a more frequent, but less drastic change. For simplicity, we assume a fully connected network. From Figure S5 we conclude that Figure S1 : Same as Figure 3 in main text, except for assuming a search radius of r = 3 and a 2D landscape as in Mason and Watts (2012) . . Best sample size. We focus on identifying the best sample size for the best member and conformity strategies, assuming a fully connected network. Sample size has no effect on random copying. Table S2 shows performance of the main strategies at the final time step (t = 200) as a function of sample size. For the best member strategy the best sample size turns out to be s = 2, however, since it does not change any of our main conclusions, we chose to keep sample size of s = 3 in the main text to make it directly comparable to the conformity strategy that also uses a sample size of s = 3 (note also that s = 3 is the sample size that participants in Mason and Watts (2012) had access to). For conformity the best sample size is s = 3 When s = 2 the strategy is never able to identify the most frequent solution out of two options and, therefore, always relies on individual learning. However, increasing sample size above 3 quickly decreases the performance of the conformity strategy.
D Performance of each strategy in different environments
We explore landscapes with N = 15 and K = [2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14] . Our choices for values of N and K are representative of the literature. In Table S3 we report the mean performance of each strategy, maximum and minimum performance and standard deviation. Our results are robust to varying levels of K. Figure S6 : Simplified illustration of the two task environments studied. A: Simple environment with a single global optimum. B: Complex environment with multiple local optima and a global optimum. In the simple environment nearby solutions have very similar payoffs, therefore, gradual improvement of a solution will eventually lead to the global optimum. In the complex environment payoffs of nearby solutions can be very different, therefore, gradual improvement of a solution can lead to local optima from which it is impossible to improve and, as a result, to find the global optimum. 
Performance variability across repetitions
Performance at t=200 
